General Obasanjo addresses the United Nations General Assembly

Lieutenant General Olusegun Mathew Okikiola Obasanjo (Head of State of Nigeria)

naptu2: Brigadier Benjamin Adekunle (The Black Scorpion) 



The sign hanging from the door of his office read "ENTER UNDER PAIN OF DEATH". It was written in... was it red ink, or was it blood?

These men were so young...

naptu2: The Black Scorpion



"....We shoot at everything that moves and when our troops march into the centre of Ibo territory, we shoot at everything, even at things that do not move... "

Lol. Conan the Destroyer

naptu2: Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu

Is is just me or did this man look like Rick Ross?

Look at his stubborn face. Reminds me of my youngest brother

President Shehu Aliyu Usman Shagari

Azikiwe, Awolowo and Waziri meet in Enugu.


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6dlS-Ex3ixU

President Shagari

President Shagari's state visit to the UK (1981)


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AXrqlOTWe1U

Alhaji Umaru Dikko (Minister for transportation)

President Shagari

Major General Muhammadu Buhari (Head of State and Commander in Chief).




Major General Buhari swears in state governors and members of the SMC.


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zseGj3GzTp8


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z_JjYG-ef8M

Ishilove:
Is is just me or did this man look like Rick Ross?

Look at his stubborn face. Reminds me of my youngest brother

Ahh! u got vision 20/20 ....lol

@naptu,did u get the information from diffrent books,can i have the names,secondly i suggest you do more research startng from the time of glovers army,the mandara boys who made up the first unit of the nigerian army probably in the eighten eighties and other relevant info,you could actually publish it,thirdly why was adekunle called black scorpion am very intrested in his psychology.am an avid history buff and of recent have been intrested in the nigerian history,the soldiers then were to die for,really,nigeria has bbeen full of intrigues,backstabbing and power tussles,no wonder old soldiers like obasajo dont give two fuc.ks,much respect to all players.god bless for the education

Major General Tunde Idiagbon (Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters).

ehie: @naptu,did u get the information from diffrent books,can i have the names,secondly i suggest you do more research startng from the time of glovers army,the mandara boys who made up the first unit of the nigerian army probably in the eighten eighties and other relevant info,you could actually publish it,thirdly why was adekunle called black scorpion am very intrested in his psychology.am an avid history buff and of recent have been intrested in the nigerian history,the soldiers then were to die for,really,nigeria has bbeen full of intrigues,backstabbing and power tussles,no wonder old soldiers like obasajo dont give two fuc.ks,much respect to all players.god bless for the education

Thanks very much. I will give you a more detailed reply when I get to a pause in the story, but Glover's Hausas. I've been typing that thing (history of the Nigerian Army) for a long time. I've only just managed to get past the First World War.

Major General Muhammadu Buhari

Major General Muhammadu Buhari (Head of State and Commander in Chief).



In June 1983, among the new graduates of the Nigerian Defence Academy was 23 year old 2/Lt. P. Odoba. After commissioning, he was deployed to the Brigade of Guards Garrison, Lagos to begin a journey, the twists and turns of which he could not have guessed in his wildest dreams.

On December 31, 1983, Odoba was the duty officer at the Radio Station, Federal Radio Corporation, Ikoyi, Lagos. The night before he was casually told by the Acting Commander of the Brigade of Guards, Lt. Col. Sabo Aliyu that some armored vehicles and soldiers would be coming to the radio station for an 'exercise' and that he should not ask questions or resist. He complied. Shortly thereafter, Brigadier Sani Abacha, then Commander of the 9th Mechanized Infantry Brigade based at Ikeja, arrived to deliver the speech that ended the regime of President Shehu Shagari and Nigeria's second experiment with democracy. Brigadier Muhammadu Buhari, former GOC of the 3rd Armoured Division, emerged as the Head of State, while Brigadier Tunde Idiagbon, former Military Secretary, was appointed Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters and Brigadier Ibrahim Babangida, former Director of Army Staff Duties and Plans - and the operational backbone of the coup - assumed the position of Chief of Army Staff.

As fate would have it, twenty months later on Sallah Day, Id-el-Kabir August 26/27, 1985, Odoba, now a full lieutenant, was again at the FRCN Radio station in Ikoyi as the duty officer. Once again he was told by his Garrison Commander not to resist when he sees armored vehicles approaching for yet another 'exercise'. Shortly thereafter, Colonel Joshua Nimyel Dogonyaro, Director of Manning ("A" Branch) and concurrent Director of the Department of Armour at the Army Headquarters arrived, barely taking notice of the young officer.

At 0600 hours on Tuesday August 27, 1985, snoozy from the laid back atmosphere of a moslem public holiday, unsuspecting Nigerians woke up to familiar cycles of martial music interspersed with a radio announcement made in an unfamiliar voice. It was Dogonyaro. Among other things, he said: 'A small group of individuals in the Supreme Military Council had abused their power and failed to listen to the advice of their colleagues or the public, about tackling the country's economic problems.' He then announced that the regime of Major General Muhammadu Buhari had been deposed. Hours later, at about 1 pm, the more familiar voice of Brigadier Sani Abacha, then GOC, 2nd Mechanized Division of the Nigerian Army, based in Ibadan, came on to announce the appointment of Major General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida, then Chief of Army Staff, as the new Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.

As Head of State, Buhari's isolation from the military was gradual but relentless. It began almost as soon as he came to power in 1984. While he was fixated on purely political national issues with religious fervor, he did not notice that specific officers were being quietly placed in specific operational positions to lay in wait like 'sleepers' until they would be called upon to strike by the very service chiefs he had naively placed his trust in to run the armed forces on his behalf.

A classic example was the way then Lt. Col. Halilu Akilu, already a Grade 1 Staff Officer in the Directorate, was inserted into the office of Director of Military Intelligence while the regular person on seat, then Lt. Col. MC Alli, was away to Britain and the US for a very brief official assignment establishing liaison with other military intelligence groups. MC Alli had been deputising for Col. Aliyu Mohammed who had left for a course at the Royal College of Defence Studies after assisting the overthrow of President Shagari. [Aliyu Mohammed later returned to start up the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) with Col. S. Anthony Ukpo as his deputy - although the DIA was not formally established in law until June 1986 when Decree Number 19 was promulgated]. Akilu was Babangida's mole in the intelligence community, a counterweight to Alhaji Muhammadu Lawal Rafindadi, Buhari's loyal Director of the Nigerian Security Organization (NSO).

There were rumours that a coup was in the offing. Major General MC Alli, for example, says in his memoirs that Mr. Alex Ibru, a leading business entrepreneur, expressed concern about word on the streets that Babangida was not seeing 'eye to eye' with the Buhari/Idiagbon dyad. Accompanied by then Lt. Col. MC Alli, Ibru even met with Gen. Idiagbon in his house to discuss the matter, but Idiagbon chose to project a veneer of calm, playing down the risk and falsely assuring Ibru that all was well. On yet another occasion, Lt. Col. MC Alli heard rumors from other sources that a coup was in the offing. However, like many Nigerian rulers before him, Idiagbon blew off the warning, saying, "Let them try".

General Buhari himself may have been warned too. He said during an interview many years later that the intelligence was vague. Vague, yes, and even deceptive too. At one point, in what was a high stakes game of deception, the Directorate of Military Intelligence deliberately fed the Press with rumors that Colonel Tanko Ayuba was under surveillance or arrested for coup plotting. The story was milked for what it was worth in throwing the Nigerian Security Organization off track and off the scent of the real planners (as was the case with Barrientos in the movie "Power Play". Ayuba later emerged 'indignantly' to deny it all, when in fact; he was an insider in the conspiracy. The Press was warned to stop spreading rumors.

Having pre-positioned selected officers in strategic units since early 1984, it was not too difficult to formulate a plan for the coup de grace against Buhari. The plan was driven by the capabilities offered by penetration of key units - either for full mobilization or passive neutralization, aided to a large extent by the authority structure and prerogatives of the Office of the Chief of Army Staff. In other words, the means were in place and the motive had been fine-tuned. What was left was the opportunity.

Various sources claim that planning took place in Lagos, Minna and London. In Minna, capital of the home state of the COAS and principal location for the conspiracy, the Military Governor, Lt. Col. David Mark, allegedly provided cover, guest houses and other resources for such activity. Obviously the local Brigade Commander, Lt. Col. Olurin, was not ignorant. Other sources say small groups of plotters and enablers also milled in and out of London - particularly around a certain apartment in Kensington. Lastly, under cover of a nationwide tour of military formations in July, General Babangida was said to have tied up loose ends.

Deception operations - targeted at the Nigerian Security Organization and psychological operations - targeted at the Nigerian public to undermine the legitimacy of the regime in the public eye.

A Dictatorship is like a poisonous snake. To kill it requires a direct hit on the head, not a body scratch or tail step. The basic concept, therefore, was to isolate and arrest the Head of State very early, disconnecting him from the chain of command; neutralize likely avenues of sympathetic resistance and simultaneously occupy vulnerable points such as Radio and TV stations, telephone exchange, police signals installations, airfields and civilian administrative establishments.

Sources say General Buhari initially left Lagos for Daura for the Sallah break but then returned to Lagos, right into the jaws of the Tiger.

Although he had a stern image among civilians, the Chief of Staff (Maj. Gen Tunde Idiagbon) had gone from a Staff position as Military Secretary (1981-83) to that of COS, SHQ. Even before his tour of duty as Military Secretary, it had been a long time since he directly commanded troops. Therefore, he had no recent command link with or visceral connection to any viable body of troops that he could use to fight the plotters. This factor of prior command, also raised as an issue with Buhari, is not trivial. When President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela was briefly overthrown, it was the crack paratrooper unit in which he had previously served that first dissociated itself from the plotters and began the process of returning him to power within 48 hours.

Nevertheless, Idiagbon had traveled out of the country on pilgrimage, and was, thus, one less major target to be bothered about. Indeed some sources say he was accompanied by Chief MKO Abiola (who was allegedly well aware of the plot and may have gone along for the pilgrimage as a form of deception and a source of intelligence). Other prominent military officers on the delegation allegedly included Generals Nassarawa, and Vatsa.

In the years since the coup, some have speculated that the coup would have been more difficult if Idiagbon was in the country. The truth is that if the Chief of Staff had been around (or if he returned unexpectedly as happened with Lt Col. Walbe in 1975 from Kampala), his arrest would likely have been handled in the usual way others had been handled in the past. Units of the Guards Brigade, which had already been penetrated, supplied guards at his residence.

The question of political and military timing, as always, was important. An elaborate military exercise was contrived at about that time, allowing the concentration of many Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) and Armoured Fighting vehicles (AFVs) at the Ikeja Barracks - which were actually on "standby" for almost a week before Babangida struck.

Although the coup took place in the early hours of the 27th, much of the final mobilization actually started in the morning, between 8am and 9am, just before Mosque time on August 26, 1985, the Muslim festival of Eid-el-Kabir. Being Sallah Day, it would theoretically be least expected and alertness not at peak.

From Ikeja Cantonment, which had been designated as the main concentration point, task groups were to fan out all over the Lagos area, coordinating their efforts with those launched or on stand-by from other military barracks. Key officers congregated at the Armour HQ Battalion Officers Mess in the hours before H-hour. Drinks and food were freely available to assist bonding.

The designated Coordinating Center (or War Room) for coup activities on D-Day was the main hall of the Bonny Camp Visiting Officers guesthouse on Victoria Island in Lagos. Security for coup planners was provided mainly by elements of the 6th Guards battalion (supported by a Recce troop) placed on standby at the Camp.


Key fighting units in the federal capital area at that time belonged to the Brigade of Guards and Army HQ formations, although the 9th Mechanized Brigade based at Ikeja was (as had been the case in the past) close enough to be a factor. Fighting battalions at Owode, Ibadan, Okitipupa, Benin, Akure, Ilorin, etc were more remote but still a threat if they fell under command of hostile officers. Therefore, support of the entire leadership of the 2nd Mechanized Division, based at Ibadan, and its fighting Brigades (like the 4th and 9th) was essential. Abacha, Shagaya and Inienger were onboard. Indeed, shortly after midnight, early on the 27th, Brigadier Abacha and most of his Staff Officers at the Divisional HQ in Ibadan arrived in Lagos in a high-speed motor convoy and (other than one late comer) were the last vehicles allowed to go past the tollgate that night.

In Lagos, the Guards Brigade (under Lt. Col. Sabo Aliyu) comprised the Guards Garrison at Obalende (under Captain Maitama), 6th Guards Battalion in Bonny Camp (under Lt. Col Joshua Madaki), 123rd Guards Battalion at Ikeja (under Major John Y Madaki) and the 93rd Guards Battalion at Ojo. At Ikeja, the Corps HQ Armoured Unit (under Bulus) and 245 Recce Battalion (under Khobe) were on hand, within striking distance of the State House, where some of their subunits were already stationed on guard duty, like Trojan horses.

With the exception of the overall Commander of the Guards Brigade, Col. Sabo Aliyu, the commanding officers of the 6th, 123rd and 93rd Battalions as well as the Guards Garrison had all been recruited into the plot (or had switched sides, depending on one's point of view).

From a military standpoint, the coup was basically a "cut off and kill" routine. One of the first acts of the operation, therefore, would be the closure of the TollGate along Lagos-Ibadan expressway, to cut the federal capital off along that axis. Seizure of the domestic, international and military wings of the Murtala Muhammed Airport was essential to prevent the Air Force from being able to deploy C-130 tactical transports for loyal troops - in addition to cutting off internal and external civil flights. In any case, the Chief of Air Staff at that time, Air Vice Marshall Ibrahim Alfa wasn't hostile to the coup - although the same could not be said for some of his Air Officers Commanding. This concern is what motivated the 202 Armoured battalion in Kaduna (under UK Bello), for example, to deploy Armoured vehicles and park them in a blocking configuration right on top of the runway at the Air Force Base in Kaduna (as was the case in the movie "Power Play".

The Lagos State Police Command HQ at Oduduwa Street, Ikeja G.R.A. and the National Police HQ (Kam Salem House) along Moloney Street were also to be secured to prevent the Police from being used as a surrogate mechanism for mobilizing loyal forces.

Naturally the Radio Station was a key target. The Duty Officer that day (Odoba) was from the Guards Garrison, whose commanding officer (Maitama) was onboard. Seizing the Station, therefore, would be a walkover.

Lastly, as noted above, Major General MC Alli (rtd) said the Palace coup was "received with press-inspired fanfare". Expectations were for aggressive marketing of the coup by the Concord Group of newspapers in the transitional period before the new regime would settle down to control key state organs of propaganda. A retrospective re-read of news items in those newspapers in the first week after the coup suggests that such an undercurrent seems to have been in play. To supplement these arrangements, the unpopular Decree No. 4., originally promulgated with unanimity by the SMC, was to be tactically (but only temporarily) abrogated immediately to get buy-in from the strategic "Lagos-Ibadan" Press.

LAGOS

In the morning of August 26th, as Muslims were preparing to go to the Mosque for morning prayers on Sallah day at the Ikeja Cantonment, word came to key players at Tactical levels that the operation was a go, destined for that night.

As the day progressed, therefore, strong indications emerged that something was about to happen. Efforts were, therefore, made by the C-in-C, the Commander, Brigade of Guards and the ADC to the C-in-C to find out details and prepare for eventualities.

Lt. Col. Sabo Aliyu, Commander of the Guards Brigade, reportedly kept asking his friend, course-mate and fellow Kano indigene, Lt. Col. H. Akilu, Director of Military Intelligence, if there was any truth to the rumors. They even attended mosque together that Sallah morning. Akilu reportedly assured Sabo Aliyu that it had been investigated and that there was nothing to fear. Part of the confusion, though, was caused by the deliberate "pseudo-false" rumor planted by Military Intelligence operatives to the effect that Colonel Aliyu Mohammed was planning "something" in reaction to his retirement and that soldiers should be ready for internal security to PROTECT the regime. However, in reality, this proactive rumor and game of smoking mirrors was intended as a pretext to allow the full mobilization of troops AGAINST the regime!

Nevertheless, both Major Jokolo (ADC to the C-in-C) and Col. Sabo Aliyu (Commander, Brigade of Guards) kept shuttling or calling back and forth between Ikoyi, Victoria Island and Ikeja seeking information and checking on the status of units, unaware that they were being monitored by Military Intelligence. Just after 9pm, riding together in Jokolo's car, on a trip to Ikeja Cantonment, uncomfortably close in time to H-Hour, they were arrested at the gate by soldiers and subalterns from units under Majors John Y. Madaki and Maxwell Khobe, stripped and severely beaten. In fact shots were fired at the Mercedes car and its tires deflated. They were later taken and kept at the Officers Quarters in Bonny Camp - a makeshift transit detention point where, thereafter, they were joined by General Buhari, Ambassador Lawal Rafindadi and General Tunde Idiagbon when the latter returned to the country from Mecca a few days later.

In the meantime, earlier in the day, having failed repeatedly to get Brigadier Abacha, GOC, 2nd Division, on the telephone or by signal, Col. Sabo Aliyu sent Captain Maitama of the Guards Garrison on an errand to drive all the way to Ibadan. He was asked to speak to Abacha personally with a message from the C-in-C to clarify his position. The Captain (who was already part of the conspiracy anyway) returned to Lagos 'empty handed', with no reported contact with the GOC.

Similarly, the COAS (Babangida) 'could not be reached' by the C-in-C, having left Lagos for Minna, allegedly for Sallah. Needless to say, his Military Assistant - Major Aminu - whom he had left behind in Lagos to assist with coordination and operations could reach him although the Head of State could not.

By nightfall, therefore, the grim nature of the situation was clear to General Buhari. His COS, SHQ was outside the country in Saudi Arabia. His COAS was away to Minna and was not returning calls. Neither could he reach the GOC of the 2nd Division. The Commander, Brigade of Guards had disappeared, arrested at Ikeja. He could not even find his own ADC who had also been arrested. The young Garrison Commander he had relied upon to deliver messages to Ibadan suddenly became scarce. The CO of the 6th Battalion at Bonny camp nearby, Lt. Col. Joshua Madaki*, was not on his side. The NSO had no fighting units of its own. The Chairman Joint Chiefs, General Bali, had no Army to command even if he wanted. The Minister of Internal Affairs, General Magoro, had no Internal Affairs Troops of his own either and was certainly not going to deploy Customs or Prisons Officers against the Army. Units from the 3rd Division, far away in Jos where Buhari held his last command before January 1984 were too far away - and as was to transpire later that evening, would shortly be without a GOC anyway. The die was cast and all that remained was for him to wait patiently, surrounded by soldiers from Guards Units of doubtful loyalty at the State House, Dodan Barracks, until daybreak when the curtains fell. The rug symbolizing the machinery of State had been pulled from under his feet.

At H-hour, designated units in Lagos sped toward their objectives. Occupation of vulnerable points or fully mobilized standby status was allotted to officers and soldiers of 123rd Battalion, 245 Recce Bn, 201 Armoured HQ Battalion, the 6th battalion at Bonny Camp and the 93rd battalion at Ojo cantonment. The 123 Battalion (under Major J Madaki) in particular was crucial to securing the tollgate, Lagos State Police Command HQ at Ikeja and the International Airport, in addition to some key road junctions in the mainland area.

Although most news reports and commentaries keep describing the August coup as bloodless, it was not. The platoon sent to the Lagos State Police Command HQ, on Oduduwa Street at Ikeja GRA opened fire without provocation at a group of Policemen killing an untold number in the process.

The 6th Battalion (under Lt. Col. Joshua Madaki) was charged with soft operations and standby on Lagos Island - including securing the eastern approaches to Victoria Island from Epe. The 93rd Battalion at Ojo set up similar observation points along the Badagry Road and in the Port area.
Armoured Vehicles and storm troopers from units commanded by Majors Khobe and Bulus were detailed to primarily move to the FRCN Station Ikoyi and State House Dodan Barracks (mainly Khobe), while also providing secondary support in depth to infantry units deployed to the Anthony, Oshodi and Ikeja areas (mainly Bulus).
Civilians returning from late night Sallah parties in Surulere were startled to stumble into these vehicles along Western Avenue as they made their way their way to Lagos Island that morning. Just before crossing the Eko Bridge into Lagos Island, machine guns on some of the armoured fighting vehicles were even tested by shooting into the air, thereby unnecessarily creating panic. One soldier's hand was later crushed by an armoured vehicle while trying to open the gate of Dodan Barracks at the launch of that phase of the operation.

At Dodan Barracks, four young Majors were detailed to arrest the Head of State. They were Majors Umar Dangiwa, Lawan Gwadabe, Abdulmumuni Aminu and Sambo Dasuki. They achieved this without much ado. In fact General Buhari was said to be waiting for them (some say watching events at the gate on close circuit TV) and allegedly gave orders to bewildered soldiers on the premises that the unusual early morning activities of those who came to arrest him were not to be disrupted. He accompanied his captors, initially to Bonny camp from where he was later moved (under House Arrest) to No. 1 Hawkesworth Road, Ikoyi. He was there for less than a week before being moved again, probably to a house in Benin-City. Meanwhile the official premises of the Head of State at State House, Dodan Barracks was ransacked and Buhari's belongings looted by soldiers.

Assisted by an unopposed entry into the Radio Station contrived by the Guards Garrison Commander, Colonel Joshua Dogonyaro's task was to make the crucial radio broadcast at 0600 bringing the regime of Major General Buhari to an end.

As daybreak progressed, coup coordinators at Bonny Camp established radio communication with all Divisions and Brigades in the country to obtain situation reports and pledges of loyalty in their areas of responsibility. General Babangida was then contacted in Minna to return to Lagos to take charge and arrangements made for a plane to go and fetch him. At this point bottles of champagne were opened to celebrate the coup. A quick meeting of key plotters took place at the Camp after which there was a further radio broadcast to the nation by Brigadier Sani Abacha at 1300, formally appointing Major General Ibrahim B. Babangida, erstwhile Chief of Army Staff, as the new C-in-C.

Analytically speaking, it is important to appreciate the deftness that went into the allocation of highly sensitive tasks in Lagos. Four different officers, all independently personally connected and fanatically loyal to the Chief of Army Staff, from three different Corps (Infantry - Aminu, Armour - Umar/Gwadabe and Artillery - Dasuki) were entrusted with the arrest of General Buhari. None had a direct command of their own on the ground at the State House.
Theoretically mutually supporting, they were likely also intended (without realizing it) to be watching one another. The two officers with direct command of troops and armoured vehicles (Khobe and Bulus) were not entrusted with the arrest of the C-in-C or the radio announcement. Those entrusted with the Radio announcement (Dogonyaro and Abacha) were not entrusted with the arrest of the C-in-C. The CO of the 6th Battalion (Joshua Madaki) was placed on standby mainly in the Victoria Island area. Although trusted, the CO of the 123 Battalion (John Madaki) whose boys were in control of the Murtala Muhammed Airport into which Babangida was to fly back, had no tactical dominance of either the State House or Radio Station area of operations. In coming to Lagos Island from Ibadan to mingle with other plotters, Brigadier S. Abacha was not in a position to draw directly on his own troops from the 2nd Division at either the State House or the Radio Station. He was dependent on boys from the Brigade of Guards and the Armoured Corps (neither of which he had ever commanded) with no direct independent axis of personal loyalty to him - and his closest Brigade Commander at the 9th Bde, Lt. Col. J. Shagaya, was an IBB boy. In other words, Major General Babangida could fly back to Lagos from Minna confident that he would not be upstaged on arrival and arrested by ambitious fellow conspirators in a coup-within-a-coup as happened to Colonel Anthony Narriman in the movie "Power Play."

General Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida (President & Commander in Chief)

Commodore Ebitu Ukiwe (Chief of General Staff). Picture was actually taken when he was Lagos State Governor.

Major General Mamman Jiya Vatsa (F.C.T Minister)

Dele Giwa

thanks

From Left to Right: Captain N. Empere (Military Police), Major Gideon G. Orkar (Armour), Captain P.A. Dakolo (Infantry), Lt. C.O. Ozualor (Armour) and Lt. C.O. Odey.



I will never ever forget those days for as long as I live. Saturday April 21, Sunday April 22nd and Wednesday April 25th.

The saturday fire. There was no crane (snorkel) @ the Awolowo Road fire station. The snorkel @ Campbell street had malfunctioned a long time ago. The only snorkel was at State House Fire Station (Dodan Barracks), just a short walk down the street, but they refused to respond to the fire (strictly for Dodan Barracks). For some reason I was deeply depressed on that day.

The midnight explosions (they said it was the ac compressor, exploding because of the heat of the fire. Yeah right!). Who knew that a battle was raging around us?

The bright sunday morning. Depression gone. Feeling very happy. Then I decided to test out my theory. I was looking right at the building when I heard another explosion. Certainly wasn't from that building. In fact. . . It came from Dodan Barracks.

The radio 10:89. Now, although John Philip Soussa was one of my favourite composers, I couldn't listen to any of his compositions for many years after this experience. I kept hearing artillery guns going off (especially when I listened to "Washington Post" ). They kept playing that music over and over and then the announcements and then the interrogation of tortured guards. I probably knew some of those guards.

My relatives were celebrating. Babangida's gone! So this was the first coup that I got to ask that question, "why are you celebrating? How do you know that whoever takes over won't be worse than Babangida? What if Pele comes in to replace Maradona?"

Ribadu Road was surprisingly deserted, while a live action movie was taking place on Obalende Road. Ikoyi Road? Only a complete lunatic would attempt to get there. There were soldiers in the trees and bushes on Glover Road.

Then there were the explosions. It was as if they were signalling each other. Dodan Barracks, then Radio Nigeria, then Bonny Camp, then Dodan Barracks again. Yet people were playing football! It was so surreal.

Then the wednesday. How would you feel if you were fast asleep in the morning on a sallah holiday, all's well with the world and then someone taps you, you wake up and realise that you are staring up the barrel of an AK47 and the soldier at the other end is dressed in full battle fatigues (including leaves)? It happened to them. Me. . . I always know when these things are going to happen, so I was alert and waiting for them. It seems funny now, but it wasn't funny then. May it never happen again.

Those Dele Giwa's pictures haunted my childhood seriously. I think it was plastered all over Tell magazine. Very depressing shots.

@naptu2

wow!! Who are u?
This sounds more like an insiders perspective or the son/brother to an insider

Naptu2, you've got mail.

This is by far the most interesting and educative thread on NL i've ever read. Keep it up

naptu2: From Left to Right: Captain N. Empere (Military Police), Major Gideon G. Orkar (Armour), Captain P.A. Dakolo (Infantry), Lt. C.O. Ozualor (Armour) and Lt. C.O. Odey.



I will never ever forget those days for as long as I live. Saturday April 21, Sunday April 22nd and Wednesday April 25th.

The saturday fire. There was no crane (snorkel) @ the Awolowo Road fire station. The snorkel @ Campbell street had malfunctioned a long time ago. The only snorkel was at State House Fire Station (Dodan Barracks), just a short walk down the street, but they refused to respond to the fire (strictly for Dodan Barracks). For some reason I was deeply depressed on that day.

The midnight explosions (they said it was the ac compressor, exploding because of the heat of the fire. Yeah right!). Who knew that a battle was raging around us?

The bright sunday morning. Depression gone. Feeling very happy. Then I decided to test out my theory. I was looking right at the building when I heard another explosion. Certainly wasn't from that building. In fact. . . It came from Dodan Barracks.

The radio 10:89. Now, although John Philip Soussa was one of my favourite composers, I couldn't listen to any of his compositions for many years after this experience. I kept hearing artillery guns going off (especially when I listened to "Washington Post" ). They kept playing that music over and over and then the announcements and then the interrogation of tortured guards. I probably knew some of those guards.

My relatives were celebrating. Babangida's gone! So this was the first coup that I got to ask that question, "why are you celebrating? How do you know that whoever takes over won't be worse than Babangida? What if Pele comes in to replace Maradona?"

Ribadu Road was surprisingly deserted, while a live action movie was taking place on Obalende Road. Ikoyi Road? Only a complete lunatic would attempt to get there. There were soldiers in the trees and bushes on Glover Road.

Then there were the explosions. It was as if they were signalling each other. Dodan Barracks, then Radio Nigeria, then Bonny Camp, then Dodan Barracks again. Yet people were playing football! It was so surreal.

Then the wednesday. How would you feel if you were fast asleep in the morning on a sallah holiday, all's well with the world and then someone taps you, you wake up and realise that you are staring up the barrel of an AK47 and the soldier at the other end is dressed in full battle fatigues (including leaves)? It happened to them. Me. . . I always know when these things are going to happen, so I was alert and waiting for them. It seems funny now, but it wasn't funny then. May it never happen again.

Are you quoting a source or this really happened to YOU? ?

This naptu2 guy stays ignoring my questions... If you pride yourself on being a student of Nigerian history, educate others and stop ignoring the questions... That's something neither kats nor Chief Negro_nts would have done..

- What happened to the state house in Marina?

- And who are the Idejo family?

dodan barracks,name almost lost in the journey of time,lol missing those years,when activists were respected,leaders were feared,papers well written and well read,beautiful times,fearful times,political intrigues united us,had to be educated and articulate just to put ur views across,everything is downhill now,why was adekunle called black scorpion,more on mamman vasta, poet and a soldier,imagine the contrast.keep flying the flag

soyinka stayed a year plus in solitary confinement,would have driven a sane man mad,he was a great fighter,deserves a medal,men were men then