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Did Gowon Give Bakassi To Cameroon? - Politics - Nairaland

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Did Gowon Give Bakassi To Cameroon? by huxley(m): 11:21pm On Aug 19, 2008
http://www.omoigui.com/
Gowon and Bakassi
By Dr. Nowa Omoigui
To the Editor, Guardian Newspapers, Lagos, Nigeria
Sir
In a recent article titled "Gowon, the Queen and the stolen bronze", Reuben Abati raised
interesting questions about the alleged expropriation of an original piece of Benin
artwork from the National museum by General Gowon enroute to Britain in 1973 for a
State trip.
I understand the sentiment he projected and agree with the moral outrage over the
museum matter.
However, I was bothered by his attempt to link the issue of the Benin Bronze gift to the
Bakassi question. A journalist of Abati's stature ought to be much more familiar with the
truth about the Bakassi issue. The media should refrain from sensational publications
which can smear people unnecessarily and/or push government into an untenable
domestic political corner in dealing with complex external affairs issues.
Again and again, over the years (since the July 1975 coup) this false story has been
peddled around that Gowon gave away Bakassi to Cameroun as a gift. It is one of the
bigger lies of the modern Nigerian generation - a lie which has affected Nigeria's
approach over the years to the Bakassi dispute and has even unnecessarily cost the lives
of Nigerian soldiers.
Briefly, let me point out that:
1. Treaties between Britain and Germany dating back to 1913, official Nigerian regional
border delineation (eg The Legal Notice No. 126 of 1954), as well as British-Nigerian
http://www.omoigui.com/ 2
and Nigerian-Cameroun exchange of diplomatic notes (1960-2) all clarified the matter
LONG BEFORE Gowon ever came to power in 1966.
2. Administrative maps of Nigeria have continued to reflect these realities, showing
Bakassi inside Cameroun, except the few that were reprinted in 1991 (during the
Babangida/Aikhomu regime) to try to reinvent the wheel. A courtesy visit to most
Government ministries in Nigeria, which often pin Nigerian maps up on walls, will
confirm this observation. Pay particular attention to the South-east corner and notice
where the maps claim Bakassi is.
3. During the Cameroon/Nigeria plebiscite of 1961, 21 polling stations were physically
located in the Bakassi peninsula. UN records clearly show that approximately 73% of the
people living there AT THAT TIME voted NOT to be administered under independent
Nigeria. This is fairly easy to confirm either from the UN itself or Ambassador BA Clark
who was Deputy Permanent Secretary External Affairs in 1970/71. The precise number
of polling booths and their exact locations is a matter of public record. It is fair to assume
that the vote was binding on future generations in the area. The question of whether it
could have been different - as was the case with Northern Cameroons - is one of the more
fascinating but unexamined aspects of Nigeria's history from that period. Whether the
vote meant that the people of Southern Cameroons should form their own country or be
fused with French Cameroun is another curious angle that has recently surfaced.
4. General Gowon was guided in his approach to the Nigeria-Cameroun border question
by a formal legal opinion prepared in 1970 by the late Teslim Elias, Nigeria's former
Attorney General and, incidentally, later a Judge of the ICJ. Elias prepared a well thought
out formal brief for then Commissioner for External Affairs, Okoi Arikpo, (who was of
South Eastern State origin), in which he clearly stated that Nigeria had no legal claim to
the Bakassi peninsula. Elias also advised that given the legal and historical precedents, as
well as the good relations between both countries, and the role Cameroun played during
the civil war, it was not wise, fair nor right for Nigeria to press the issue. This document
is available.
http://www.omoigui.com/ 3
5. In 1969, even before the Elias opinion - and long before Gowon ever met with Ahidjo
to discuss the border, the office of the Geographer, US State Department, came to the
same conclusion about the Nigeria-Cameroun border. This document is also available.
6. Although some indigenes of the area, local politicians and misguided national
commentators have raised dust over the years, the real dispute between Nigeria and
Cameroun was not originally about the shrimp rich Bakassi peninsula per se. As a
consequence of language in the original Anglo-German Treaty, the dispute was about the
OFFSHORE border and precise delineation of the APPROACH CHANNEL to the
Calabar Port. Why? Because the treaty stated that the NAVIGABLE portion of the
channel was to lie wholly within Nigeria while the peninsula itself was to lie wholly
within Cameroun - even if the Akpa Yafe river was to change its course and flow into the
Rio del Rey. The issue, therefore, was to define the navigable channel. This became more
sensitive when oil was discovered offshore.
7. General Gowon relied on experts from the Federal Survey Department in the Ministry
of Works on what the offshore delineation of the approach channel to the Calabar Estuary
should be - up to the 3-mile limit. The Nigerian civil servant (not Gowon) who actually
decided the offshore eastern border of the navigable channel - which formed the basis of
what became known as the Coker-Ngo line - was Chief R. Oluwole Coker, Director of
Federal Surveys. Accompanied by a group of civil servants from then South Eastern
(later Cross-River) State, including SJ King who had previously served as Consul
General in the Nigerian mission at Buea, the Solicitor General and Permanent Secretary
for Justice of the South Eastern State (Mr. Ukot) at that time was party to it and cosigned
the declaration. It is not, however, clear whether the Permanent Secretary of the Federal
Ministry of Works, Gray Longe, or the Federal Commissioner, Femi Okunnu, were aware
of the details. The Governor of the South Eastern State, Col. UJ Esuene was certainly in
the delegation, as was Colonel Musa Usman of the North Eastern State. Mr. U Ekaette,
now Secretary to the Obasanjo government, was also there as one of Gowon's key
assistants. Surveyor Adeleye was in attendance.
http://www.omoigui.com/ 4
What Gowon and Ahidjo did was to sign on either side of the Coker-Ngo line. When
Ahidjo asked Gowon to draw the line, Gowon in turn turned to Chief Coker and asked
him to define it. Gowon did not order anyone to give anything away to Cameroun, nor
did he do so himself. The specifics of this line were certainly previously fiercely debated
internally within the Survey Department at a technical level, and there were some who
felt it ought to have been further toward the Cameroun side, but it is wrong to suggest
that General Yakubu Gowon "gave away Bakassi". The issue of Bakassi itself was sealed
by the Ministry of Justice legal opinion, supported by Okoi Arikpo of External Affairs,
based on decades of legal and political precedent. If the people of the Bakassi peninsula
had either boycotted the Cameroon plebiscite altogether or had voted along with the rest
of Southern Cameroons to stay in Nigeria, the matter would have been much less
complicated - although it could still have been an internal border problem between states.
To compound issues, the late Alhaji Malabu, one time Nigerian Ambassador to
Cameroun used to say some people in the area often paid taxes to both countries. There
are unconfirmed reports that some of the local residents also kept taking part in voter
registration and elections in Nigeria AFTER voting overwelmingly to leave!
8. In reaching an agreement with Ahidjo about the Coker-Ngo "navigable channel"
border, the question of whether Gowon had the authority to do so without subsequent
ratification by the SMC was also the subject of another legal opinion by the Nigerian
Ministry of Justice of that era. Gowon's authority (as confirmed by the Justice Ministry)
derived from a decree originally promulgated by the Ironsi regime. It will be recalled that
the Supreme Military Council - under this decree - was only an advisory body to the
Head of State. Neither Ironsi nor Gowon after him required legal ratification for anything
from the SMC. This is why, for example, Ironsi was able to promulgate the unification
decree of 1966 without formal SMC approval.
Gowon's powers after July 29, 1966, (in continuation of Ironsi's powers) were the subject
of discussions at Aburi in January 1967, and led to the controversial Decree No. 8 of
1967. This decree was never, however, formally codified because Ojukwu rejected it in
the run down to the outbreak of the civil war in July 1967. It will be recalled that in late
May 1967 Gowon declared a State of Emergency and assumed full powers after the
http://www.omoigui.com/ 5
Ojukwu-appointed Eastern Regional Assembly mandated Ojukwu to declare secession. In
1969, after Colonel Obasanjo refused to cooperate with Colonel Muhammed to delay the
end of the civil war in order to force Gowon to "share power" with other officers, there
was no further opportunity (or interest) after the war to change the powers assumed in the
original Ironsi decree. The decree and Gowon's "supreme commander" like legal status
was thus in effect when the Nigerian-Cameroun Boundary commission was doing its
work in the early seventies.
9. When Brigadier Muhammed came to power in July 1975 he initially wanted to retain
this "sole power" arrangement but was overruled by the middle ranking officers
(Yar'Adua, Garba, Abdul Mohammed, Taiwo etc) who carried out the coup. This is why
he had to agree to share power with Brigadiers Obasanjo and Danjuma in a trioka. This is
also why the new decree reconstituting the new SMC in 1975 (after Gowon was
overthrown) enhanced the authority of the SMC and made it more than an advisory
council. It was in the context of this newly enhanced power for the post-July 1975 SMC
that questions were raised (retrospectively) about Gowon's authority to sign the Coker-
Ngo line. However, AT THE TIME he did, Gowon was well within his legal powers no
matter what we may feel today. However, whether the civil servants who advised him to
accept the precise location of the Coker-Ngo line, advised appropriately, is a different
issue. Whether ANY military government can sign ANY agreement whatsoever for the
country is another. The latter is a fundamental point that affects many laws, agreements
and treaties signed by Nigerian governments during the long period of military rule.
10. The sensitive question of arbitrary colonial borders in Africa affects many countries.
There are Yoruba speaking communities which are split between Nigerian and Benin
republic. There are Ewe speaking communities split between Ghana and Togo. The
question of communities split between Nigeria and Cameroun is unfortunate but not
unique. Nigeria, in ratifying instruments which established the OAU in 1963, agreed to
respect the inviolability of colonial borders. This was reflected in the 1964 OAU Cairo
Declaration on Border Disputes among African States.
http://www.omoigui.com/ 6
11. Very interestingly, it came to light during the Buhari regime that several years
AFTER Gowon left office the precise location of the Coker-Ngo line and the navigation
beacons for approaching the Calabar Estuary were shifted even further westwards toward
Nigeria making our case worse. This shift (which was done either during the Obasanjo or
Shagari regimes) may have been done without authority or proper research by the
Nigerian Ports Authority - another consequence of the frequent turn-overs of
governments in Nigeria and lack of collaboration between various pre and post-coup
regimes. Or perhaps it was done to create a reason to award a contract to dredge the area.
Who knows?
12. I humbly advise Reuben Abati (and others) to review original documents or talk
directly to those civil servants WHO WERE THERE AT THAT TIME before he (and
others) write further on the Bakassi matter, confusing Nigerian policy makers and the
public and potentially exposing our soldiers to unnecessary risk. Some of those in the
know are dead but there are others who are not.
13. Like other Nigerians, I hope the judgement of the ICJ helps to settle this issue or
create a framework for bilateral and trilateral discussions to resolve the dispute - for the
sake of those who live there and for the sake of the rest of us. I am also eager to see how
the ICJ reacts to the interesting arguments put forward by Chief Richard Akinjide and his
legal team.
14. However, in the meantime, journalists should stop repeating the lie that Gowon gave
away the Bakassi peninsula. He may have given away an original piece of Benin Bronze
to the Queen of England. But he did not give away Bakassi to Cameroun.
Nowa Omoigui
Columbia, South Carolina
USA

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